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Abstract 
Distribution system operators (DSOs) are faced with new challenges from the 
continuous integration of fluctuating renewable energy resources and new dynamic 
customer loads such as electric vehicles, into the power grid. To ensure continuous 
balancing of supply and demand, we propose procurement package auctions to allocate 
load flexibility from aggregators and customers. The contributions of this research are 
an incentive-compatible load flexibility auction along with a compact bidding language. 
It allows bidders to express minimum and maximum amounts of flexibility along with 
unit prices in single bids for varying time periods. We perform a simulation-based 
evaluation and assess costs and benefits for DSOs and balancing suppliers given 
scenarios of varying complexity as well as computational aspects of the auction. Our 
initial findings provide evidence that load flexibility auctions can reduce DSO costs 
substantially and that procurement package auctions are well-suited to address the grid 
load balancing problem. 
Keywords: Smart Grid, Auctions, Sustainability 
Introduction 
With the current energy strategy of the European Union, the vision of a sustainable, low-carbon and 
climate-friendly economy has been established. Moreover, energy security, sustainability and 
competitiveness have been identified as important dimensions of future energy markets (EC 2015). To 
this end, new electricity market designs that promote the sustainable integration of renewable energy 
sources as well as customers through demand response programs are required (EC 2015a). As a result, 
distribution system operators (DSOs) in particular are faced with new challenges, also given the growth of 
fluctuating wind and solar generation in their daily operations (EC 2009; He et al. 2013). Traditionally, 
power generation is adapted to non-controllable demand by means of non-volatile and flexible power 
plants such as pumped storage. Given the increased share of renewable generation within the grid and 
policy requirements that demand these sources to be integrated into the generation mix, this task is 
becoming much harder as demand and supply must always be in balance. To avoid critical grid situations 
where demand and supply are out of balance, DSOs can currently invoke direct load control (DLC) 
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contracts on customers or fall back to the operating reserve, which represents costly emergency 
generation solution that is currently accessed to stabilize the grid in case of near-failures. Given that DLC 
mostly applies to large customers and using the operating reserve is an expensive mechanism, recent 
literature focuses on integrating the demand side on a local level by means of demand side management 
and demand response (Albadi and El-Saadany 2008; Palensky and Dietrich 2011). DSOs could avoid high 
balancing costs by leveraging new local markets of electrical load flexibility on the demand side to 
substitute the operating reserve. 
We propose the application of package (combinatorial) auctions to allocate balancing potential of 
customers to DSOs. The combinatorial nature allows auction participants to express electricity usage 
patterns that emerge from technical or economic rationales. The contributions of this research are an 
incentive-compatible load flexibility auction for the smart grid along with a compact bidding language. It 
allows bidders to express minimum and maximum amounts of electric flexibility (production or 
consumption) along with unit prices in single bids for time periods of different size. In addition, the 
winner determination considers the operating reserve as a fixed price outside option in the procurement 
auctions. To the best of our knowledge, this combination has not been addressed in existing literature. 
This is required, however, to facilitate utilization of the full electric flexibility potential to address the grid 
load balancing problem with feasible numbers of bids. 
We evaluate our proposal by simulation experiments based on a combination of real-world and synthetic 
data and assess costs and benefits for the DSOs in scenarios of varying complexity as well as 
computational aspects of the auction.  Our findings provide evidence that load flexibility auctions can 
reduce DSO costs substantially and that procurement package auctions are well-suited to address the grid 
load balancing problem. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first present provide an overview of related work. 
Then, we discuss our research method and present the proposed bidding language and auction. This is 
followed by a description of our experiments and initial results before concluding the paper. 
Literature Review 
Smart grids facilitate monitoring and control of power systems on a granular local level in real time (DOE 
2003). This introduces capabilities already present in today's high voltage grids to the distribution grid 
where supervision was so far impossible (Varaiya et al. 2011). Hence, distribution grid control can evolve 
from a “blind” manual operation mode into a more sophisticated dynamic task in a complex granular 
system (Ipakchi and Albuyeh 2009). This enables operators to improve efficiency by achieving a better 
balance of supply and demand over space and time. The historic rule that supply follows demand changes 
into a system where both sides play an active role (Strbac 2008). Integrating the demand side has been 
focus of recent research and policy makers (SG-CG 2012; EC 2014; He et al. 2013; Sioshansi 2011). 
In the information systems (IS) area, smart grids are a prime subject of recent research (Goebel et al. 
2014; Watson et al. 2010). Here, the research focus is on novel system design and business models that 
facilitate sustainable and cost-efficient future power system. For example, Strueker and Dinther (2012) 
emphasize the need to manage demand response. Recent work focusing on IS for electric vehicles have 
been suggested by Fridgen et al. 2014a and Koroleva et al. 2014 as well as by Wagner et al. 2015. Another 
stream of research focuses on wholesale electricity prices for end consumers (e.g., Bodenbenner and 
Feuerriegel 2014; Fridgen et al. 2014b; LeMay et al. 2008). Kranz et al. 2015 give a recent overview of the 
state of energy informatics and green IS. Smart electricity markets based on combinatorial auctions as 
envisioned by McCabe et al. (1991) have seen only few adaptors. More generally, combinatorial auctions 
(Cramton et al. 2006) have emerged as a popular market mechanism in recent years. They have also 
increasingly been applied to real-world problems in various domains such as logistics (Sheffi 2004; 
Caplice 2007), telecommunications (Cramton 2013), industrial procurement (Bichler et al. 2006) or cloud 
computing (Zaman and Grosu 2013). Combinatorial auctions aim for an efficient resource allocation while 
considering complex bidder preferences for multiple items (bundles). Fukuta and Ito (2012) consider the 
allocation of electricity based on production plans from factories on a daily basis. We revisit this idea and 
consider the special case of distribution grid balancing requirements, where allocations are required intra-
day and different generation as well as production capabilities are taken into account. To facilitate the 
utilization of the full electric flexibility potential with feasible number of bids, a compact bidding language 
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that allows bidders to express minimum and maximum amounts of their flexibility (production or 
consumption) along with unit prices in single bids for time periods of different length is required. In 
addition, the winner determination has to consider the operating reserve as a fixed price outside option. 
To the best of our knowledge, this combination has not been proposed in existing literature. 
Mechanism design and auction theory provide mature and rigorous methods to build and analyze market 
designs. An auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and pricing rule. The former allocates the 
items among the bidders based on their reported types (or bids). The latter determines the prices the 
bidders have to pay (or receive in a procurement auction). The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) 
mechanisms with Clarke pivot rule (Clarke 1971; Groves 1973; Vickrey 1961) constitutes the only strategy-
proof mechanism that maximizes social welfare when payments from (to) losing bidders are zero. To 
implement a package auction, the representation of bids (i.e., valuations of bidders) must be encoded in a 
bidding language to be send to the auctioneer. In combinatorial auctions with m items there are 2m - 1 
non-empty subsets. Therefore, succinct representations of valuations are often required for practical 
applications. The design of a bidding language is essentially a trade-off between expressiveness and 
simplicity (Nisan et al. 2007). Goossens et al. (2007) and Bichler et al. (2011) propose bidding languages 
which allow specifying bidder cost functions in markets with economies of scale and scope. In our current 
approach, bidders need to specify discounts with explicit bids for different amounts, though we will 
investigate the integration of bidders’ cost functions in future research. Boutilier and Hoos (2001) 
propose a generalized language where bids are given by propositional formulae whose subformulae can be 
annotated with prices. However, for larger markets with many items like the one discussed in our 
research, even logical bidding languages with full expressiveness may require many bids to be submitted. 
In this case, domain-specific languages can provide the required expressiveness more succinctly and in a 
way that is common in the respective domain. For example, Goetzendorff et al. (2015) propose a domain-
specific bidding language for the TV ads market where bidders can specify XOR-combined tuples of 
minimum expected viewership along with prices. Our bidding language is similar in the sense that it also 
allows to specify limits of the bids’ validity. In contrast to existing work, however, it allows to bid on both 
energy production and consumption along with unit prices in single bids for time periods of different size. 
Research Method 
We follow the DSR approach proposed by Hevner et al. (2004). The method, model, and instantiation 
artifacts proposed in this research are: 1. A smart grid auction that constitutes an approach for allocating 
load flexibility from customers to address the local grid load balancing problem; 2. a compact bidding 
language that allows bidders to express minimum and maximum amounts of electric flexibility 
(production or consumption) along with unit prices in single bids for time periods of different size; and 3. 
the prototype implementation. We apply simulation experiments based partially on real-world data to 
demonstrate the utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact and provide evidence that load flexibility 
auctions can reduce DSO costs and that procurement package auctions are well-suited to address the grid 
load balancing problem. Table 1 summarizes the mapping of our approach against the DSR guidelines. 
Table 1. Mapping Against Design Science Research Guidelines  
Guideline (Hevner 
et al. 2004) 
Contribution 
Design as an artifact Our research outcomes 1. smart grid auction, 2. bidding language, and 3. 
prototype implementation constitute method, model, and instantiation 
artifacts. 
Problem relevance The addressed research problem responds to the grand challenge of grid load 
balancing with the growth of fluctuating wind and solar generation. 
Design evaluation We demonstrate utility, quality, and efficacy of our design outcomes in an 
experimental simulation study. 
Research 
contributions 
The design artifacts and design construction knowledge extend and improve 
the knowledge of electricity market design. 
Research rigor We use auction theory for artifact construction and for design evaluation. 
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Design as a search 
process 
The discovery of an effective solution in the form of the proposed smart grid 
auction and iterative improvements and extensions in future work constitute 
our search process in electricity market design. 
Communication of 
the research 
The formal models and technical details inform technology-oriented 
audiences, implications and opportunities inform management-oriented 
audiences. 
The rationale for selection of game theory to inform the construction of the artifact is as follows. The 
problem of balancing demand and supply by the DSOs is in fact a problem that is naturally addressed by a 
market. While the demand side is currently rather inflexible (i.e., there are hardly any truly dynamic 
pricing schemes for customers), the supply side has been subject to energy exchanges for over a decade. 
However, these exchanges consider large amounts of energy to balance supply and demand on an abstract 
level. In contrast, the DSOs have to balance rather small amounts, though the timely balance is not only a 
matter of economics, but also of grid stability. Mechanism design and auction theory provide mature and 
rigorous methods to build and analyze market designs (Nisan et al. 2007).  
The evaluation of the proposed artifact is informed by the literature on simulation analysis. The 
simulation of technical and economic systems is a well-established method to evaluate complex artifacts 
and can be used to numerically analyze the artifact to estimate the true systems characteristics (Law and 
Kelton 1999). We evaluate the artifact with respect to both the estimated implications for smart grid 
coordination as well as the computational complexity of different instantiations. 
Artifact Description 
We describe the load flexibility auction by first introducing the proposed bidding language. Subsequently, 
we formulate the winner determination problem and the payment rule. 
Bidding Language 
We consider a set of agents i ∈ I = {0, 1, … , ℐ } with an auctioneer (buyer) 0 and bidders (sellers) 1, … , ℐ. 
The buyer requests balancing power whereas a seller acts as balancing supplier. The bidders place bids 𝑒𝑗, 
where the set of bid indices 𝐽 = {1, 2, … , 𝒥} is partitioned into subsets of bid indices of the bidders 𝑖 such 
that ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∃! 𝐽𝑖  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ⋃  𝑖∈𝐼  𝐽𝑖 = 𝐽 and ⋂  𝑖∈𝐼  𝐽𝑖 = ∅. The bids 𝑒𝑗  can contain different energy amounts and 
directions for each time slot 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {1, 2, … , 𝒯}. The 𝑘-th delivery start time of bid 𝑗 is denoted by 𝑠𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝑇,  
the 𝑘 -th delivery direction of bid 𝑗  by 𝜙𝑗𝑘 ∈ {−1, 1} . 𝜙𝑗𝑘 = −1  denotes energy consumption (negative 
balancing capability) by the bidder and 𝜙𝑗𝑘 = 1 production (positive balancing capability) of energy by the 
bidder. The minimum and maximum delivery amounts of the 𝑘-th start time/subbid in bid 𝑗 are specified 
by 𝑎𝑗𝑘 ∈ ℝ ≥ 0  and 𝑎𝑗𝑘 ∈ ℝ ≥ 0 . The monetary bid (minimum price) per energy unit (production or 
consumption) of the 𝑘-th start time/subbid in bid 𝑗 is given by 𝑏𝑗𝑘 ∈ ℝ ≥ 0. The bidders 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∖ {0} submit 
zero or more (XORed) bids 𝑒𝑗with 
𝑒𝑗 ≔ ((𝑠𝑗1, 𝜙𝑗1, 𝑎𝑗1, 𝑎𝑗1𝑏𝑗1), … , (𝑠𝑗𝑛 , 𝜙𝑗𝑛 , 𝑎𝑗𝑛 , 𝑎𝑗𝑛𝑏𝑗𝑛)). 
Bidding Language Example 
Suppose the bidder 𝑖 wants to submit two bids with 𝐽𝑖 = {1,2}. In the first bid 𝑒1, he offers supply of 9 to 10 
EU (energy units) for 20 MU/EU (monetary units per energy unit) over 6 TU (time units), i.e., 𝑠11 =
1, 𝜙11 = 1, 𝑎11 = 9, 𝑎11 = 10 , 𝑏11 = 20. Furthermore, he offers a supply of 12 EU for 23MU/EU beginning 
at 𝑠12 = 7. Alternatively, in 𝑒2, bidder 𝑖  offers a constant supply of 8 EU for 19MU/EU (𝑠21 = 1, 𝜙21 =
1, 𝑎21 = 8, 𝑎21 = 8 , 𝑏21 = 19). Then, the submitted bids are specified as follows, also depicted in Figure 1. 
𝑒1 ⊕ 𝑒2
((𝑠11, 𝜙11, 𝑎11, 𝑎11𝑏11), (𝑠12, 𝜙12, 𝑎12, 𝑎12𝑏12)) ⊕ ((𝑠21, 𝜙21, 𝑎21, 𝑎21𝑏21))
((1,1,9,10,20), (7,1,12,12,23)) ⊕ ((1,1,8,8,19))
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Figure 1.  Delivery Amounts of Example Bids. 
Winner Determination Problem 
Let 𝜙𝑗
𝑡, 𝑎𝑗
𝑡, 𝑎𝑗
𝑡
, and 𝑏𝑗
𝑡 be the direction, minimum/maximum amount, and monetary bid submitted in the 
𝑗th bid that are valid in 𝑡 (𝜙𝑗
𝑡 , 𝑎𝑗
𝑡 , 𝑎𝑗
𝑡
, 𝑏𝑗
𝑡: (𝑠𝑗𝑛 , 𝜙𝑗𝑛 , 𝑎𝑗𝑛 , 𝑎𝑗𝑛𝑏𝑗𝑛) ∈ 𝑒𝑗 ∧ 𝑠𝑗𝑛 = max({𝑠𝑗𝑛: 𝑠𝑗𝑛 < 𝑡})). Within bid 𝑒𝑗, 
a subbid with start time 𝑠𝑗𝑛 thus implicitly remains active until superseded by another subbid with start 
time 𝑠𝑗𝑛+1 > 𝑠𝑗𝑛. 𝑎0
𝑡  specifies the amount requested by the auctioneer. The accepted positive and negative 
delivery amounts of bid 𝑗 in 𝑡  are denoted by 𝑎𝑗+
𝑡  and 𝑎𝑗−
𝑡 ∈ ℝ ≥ 0  (𝑎𝑗+
𝑡 ⋅ 𝑎𝑗−
𝑡 = 0). 𝑓+
𝑡  and 𝑓−
𝑡  denote the 
positive and negative amount of electricity (additional production or consumption) purchased using an 
outside option at prices 𝑜+
𝑡  and 𝑜−
𝑡 . Since the valuation of the buyer is assumed to be fixed and the costs 
are subtracted, the winner determination problem (i.e., maximization of social welfare, which is given by 
the difference of the valuation of the buyer and the costs by the sellers, 𝑣0(𝑋) − 𝑐(𝑋), for an allocation 𝑋, 
buyer valuation 𝑣0(𝑋), and seller costs 𝑐(𝑋)), can be formulated as the following minimization problem. 
𝑊𝐷(𝐼) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ ∑(𝑏𝑗
𝑡𝑎𝑗+
𝑡 + 𝑏𝑗
𝑡𝑎𝑗−
𝑡 ) + 𝑓+
𝑡𝑜+
𝑡 + 𝑓−
𝑡𝑜−
𝑡
𝑗∈𝐽𝑡∈𝑇
 
subject to 
∑(𝑎𝑗+
𝑡 − 𝑎𝑗−
𝑡 ) + 𝑓+
𝑡 − 𝑓−
𝑡 = 𝜙0
𝑡𝑎0
𝑡
𝑗∈𝐽
∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (1) 
𝑎𝑗+
𝑡 ≥ 𝑎𝑗
𝑡𝑥𝑗𝜙𝑗
𝑡 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (2) 
𝑎𝑗−
𝑡 ≥ −𝑎𝑗
𝑡𝑥𝑗𝜙𝑗
𝑡 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (3) 
𝑎𝑗+
𝑡 𝜙𝑗
𝑡 ≤ 𝑎𝑗
𝑡
𝑥𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (4) 
−𝑎𝑗−
𝑡 𝜙𝑗
𝑡 ≤ 𝑎𝑗
𝑡
𝑥𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (5) 
𝑎𝑗+
𝑡 𝜙𝑗
𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (6) 
−𝑎𝑗−
𝑡 𝜙𝑗
𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (7) 
𝑓+
𝑡 , 𝑓−
𝑡 ≥ 0  ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (8) 
∑ 𝑥𝑗 ≤ 1
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖
 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼  (9) 
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𝑥𝑗 ∈ {0,1}  ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽  (10) 
 
Since the load flexibility auction is a procurement auction, the objective is to minimize the cost of 
accepted bids in WD. We extend the general WD by minimum and maximum amounts, unit prices, a 
combination of energy production and consumption potential, and a fixed price outside option. 
Constraint (1) ensures that the DSO's requested balancing amount is fulfilled in every time slot. Moreover, 
constraints (2)-(5) limit the accepted amounts to the minimum and maximum amounts in the bids, in 
accordance with the offered delivery direction. Constraints (6) and (7) restrict the purchases to the offered 
direction. Constraint (8) ensures positive outside option amounts. Finally, constraint (9) models the XOR 
relation of the single bids and ensures that at most one bid can be accepted per bidder. 
Payment Rule 
We apply the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism with Clarke pivot rule (Clarke 1971; Groves 1973; 
Vickrey 1961) to determine agent payments in an incentive-compatible manner. Let 𝑏𝑖
𝑡∗ and 𝑎𝑖
𝑡∗ denote the 
winning bids and amounts of winning bidder 𝑖 from the set of winners 𝑊 ⊆ 𝐼 and let 𝑊𝐷∗(⋅) denote the 
optimal solution to WD. The payment that bidder 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∖ {0} receives is calculated as 𝑝𝑖 = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑡∗𝑎𝑖
𝑡∗ −𝑡∈𝑇
(𝑊𝐷∗(𝐼) − 𝑊𝐷∗(𝐼 ∖ {𝑖})) . That is, prices reflect the externality imposed on other players by a given agent. 
Note that the winning bid is empty and the 𝑊𝐷∗(⋅) terms cancel for non-winning bidders and are 
therefore zero. The buyer pays 𝑝0 = − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝐼∖{0} − ∑ (𝑓+
𝑡𝑜+
𝑡 + 𝑓−
𝑡𝑜−
𝑡 )𝑡∈𝑇 , i.e., VCG payments are only applied 
for the bidder side. Naturally, payments are bounded by the outside option prices as these are available 
for all 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 . Therefore, every bidder can at most receive a payment of ∑ 𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡 𝑎𝑖
𝑡∗
𝑡∈𝑇  where 𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡 =
max({𝑜+
𝑡 , 𝑜−
𝑡 }). This follows from the observation that the product of winning bids and amounts cannot 
exceed the optimal value of WD, i.e., ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑡∗𝑎𝑖
𝑡∗ ≤ 𝑊𝐷∗(𝐼)𝑡∈𝑇  ∀ 𝐼 ∖ {0}, since they are part of a sum that gives 
the resulting value. Then, we have 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑊𝐷
∗(𝐼) − (𝑊𝐷∗(𝐼) − 𝑊𝐷∗(𝐼 ∖ {𝑖})) = 𝑊𝐷∗(𝐼 ∖ {𝑖}). With 𝑊𝐷∗(⋅) ≤
∑ 𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡 𝑎𝑖
𝑡∗
𝑡∈𝑇  this yields 𝑝𝑖 ≤ ∑ 𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡 𝑎𝑖
𝑡∗
𝑡∈𝑇 . 
Evaluation 
We evaluate the proposed artifact from an economic and computational perspective in simulation 
experiments. Next, we present our assumptions as well as the underlying input data. Subsequently, we 
assess the utility, efficacy, and efficiency of the auction for different parameters. 
Simulation setup 
DSOs have to balance electrical load and generation within their local distribution grids. We assume that 
local supply is constituted by fluctuating generation from a wind farm. Time is discretized in time slots 𝑡 ∈
𝑇 = {1,2, … , 𝒯}. Additional (conventional) generation and consumption (load shedding) can be purchased 
from the transmission system operator (TSO) for outside option prices 𝑜+
𝑡  and 𝑜−
𝑡 , which are assumed to 
be higher than the costs from wind farm generation. When demand deviations from predicted generation 
occurs, load difference curves (LDCs) are calculated, which contain positive or negative load changes per 
time slot for a given period. With the LDCs, the auctions are initiated to procure the required balancing 
amounts. 
Following Feuerriegel et al. (2014), we model balancing requirements using real-world wind generation 
data provided by the EEX transparency platform (EEX 2013) for the year 2013. We use the expected and 
realized wind feed-in time series data to model the discrepancies between forecast and realized renewable 
generation. We use the Tennet transmission system as a reference scenario for balancing requests. For 
each simulation run we randomly select a week and retrieve the expected and realized wind feed-in for a 
15-minute time span. We denote the difference between realized and forecast wind feed-in as 𝛥𝑡 . 
Assuming that the DSO runs flexibility auctions for larger deviations only, we filter 𝛥𝑡to determine the 
balancing demand time 𝐷𝑡series: 𝐷𝑡 = 𝛥𝑡1(|𝛥𝑡| ≥ 𝛥). 
To illustrate, Figure 2a shows the difference between forecast and realized generation for Q1/2013. This 
data is filtered by 𝛥 which is assumed to be the 10% quantile (Fig. 2b). Finally, a time window from the 
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filtered data is chosen for the auction. We use outside option prices based on balancing power prices from 
the Tennet TSO which are in the range of [−2,498.4, 1,608.2] EUR/kWh for the year 2013. 
 
 
(a)                                                                                           
 
 
(b) 
Figure 2.  Balancing request data: (a) Raw and (b) filtered wind power deviations in Q1/2013. 
 
To harness the synergies between heterogeneous generation assets and flexible loads, the concepts of 
virtual power plant (VPP) (Pudjianto et al. 2007) and microgrid (Lasseter and Paigi 2004) have been 
introduced. While VPPs focus on generation, microgrids also include consumption properties, e.g., 
storage systems or electric vehicles. Asmus (2010) provides a detailed comparison of these concepts. We 
abstract from these concepts by focusing on the coordination properties of the auction; the investigation 
of organizational properties are beyond the scope of this research. With respect to the balancing suppliers, 
we make the following assumptions. A balancing supplier is either a single customer or a pool of 
customers in form of an aggregator. Aggregators therefore act as intermediaries between the market and 
customers that bundle flexible loads into portfolios. These entities are distinguished by the quantity of 
flexible loads they bring to the market. Furthermore, a balancing supplier communicates his collective 
flexibility potentials for the given time span 𝑇 to the market. These potentials are unidirectional and hence 
each participant will either offer positive or negative balancing capability for each 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, but never both. 
Available flexibility potentials are subject to constraints reflecting technical or economic rationales. For 
example, a small factory may have ramping cost that require it to run for a certain time to ensure 
economic viability. Similar considerations can be applied for storage systems or electric vehicle batteries 
due to deterioration considerations. For this reason, bids resulting from the available flexibility are 
subject to a minimum runtime constraint 𝑚𝑖  that limits changes from positive to negative balancing 
activity or vice versa. Here, we assume that each balancing supplier submits exactly ⌈
𝒯
𝑚𝑖
⌉ + 1 bids as 
opposed to the theoretical maximum of 2𝒯 − 1 bids. This is in accordance with his minimum runtime 
𝑚𝑖  and reflects that notion that the supplier is initially prepared to offer his complete profile or only 
exclusive parts of it. In addition, bid sizes of the different customers are heterogeneous in order to capture 
current electricity market structures with few large and many small utilities with a direct link to 
customers. To this end, we leverage Zipf's law to instantiate an empirically valid yet parsimonious model 
for modeling (firm) size heterogeneity (Axtell 2001). Bid size heterogeneity is parameterized with a 
heterogeneity level ℎ. Given the total trading volume parameter 𝐷, which is determined after all bids have 
been submitted, the 𝑘-th largest of 𝑛 firms assumes a bid size of 𝐷 ⋅ (
1
𝑘ℎ
/ ∑
𝑛
𝑗 = 1
1
𝑗ℎ
). Note that for ℎ =
0 bid sizes are uniformly distributed, whereas for ℎ → ∞  the largest bidder assumes all quantity. 
Aggregators or large individual customers are reflected by large bids whereas smaller bids reflect market 
participant of smaller relative size. 
The simulation is parameterized as follows. With 𝑛 ∈ {50,100,150,200} bidders representing small to 
medium local areas available to aggregate and bidder heterogeneity ℎ set to completely homogeneous to 
very heterogeneous ({0,0.4,0.8,1.2}) amongst all bidders, bid prices are uniformly distributed in [1,20] 
and bid minimum runtime is uniformly distributed over 𝑇. The simulation time horizon is set to 15 time 
slots. We further repeat every simulation 100 times. There are 16 parameter combinations, for which 
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different simulation experiments are conducted. Each simulation run is initiated with a DSO demand 
profile that holds for each parameter combinations. In total, we arrive at 1600 simulation runs. 
Preliminary Results 
This section presents the simulation results of the above described evaluation settings. We consider 
different evaluation contexts. In particular, we focus on the perspective of the balancing requester (DSO), 
the balancing suppliers as well as global computational considerations.  
First, we investigate the benefits of the auction for the DSO regarding different numbers of participating 
balancing suppliers. We measure reduced costs from not having to rely on the outside option, i.e. the 
DSO's savings.  As we can see in Figure 3a, average savings increase with supply size.  Given a larger 
supply size, the DSO is able to allocate more flexibility from balancing suppliers. By doing so, the same 
amount does not have to be procured from the outside option. In more detail, average savings range from 
35.38% to 42.20%. However, in settings with more balancing supply (≥ 150 bidders), we only see a 
marginal improvement in savings. Here, the size of a few larger aggregators, in particular those with no 
marginal cost, can prevent other intermediaries or small individuals from participating successfully in the 
market at some point. Given that the DSO’s objective is to fully address its balancing demand by 
employing a flexibility auction, these results suggest that the DSO must address a pool of balancing 
suppliers that is not too small and at the same time neither too homogeneous nor too heterogeneous. This 
is a relevant finding for the DSO that can help assessing appropriate regional boundaries for such a 
market. 
Given that bids from balancing suppliers are subject to a minimum runtime constraint, we now explore 
the effect of minimum runtime lengths for the supplier. We measure the effect in terms of average 
number of allocated bids per bidder over all runs. On a general level, this analysis confirms that a shorter 
minimum runtime increases the chance of being allocated (Figure 3b). In more detail, especially the 
shortest and therefore most flexible runtime 𝑚 = 1 has the greatest value for an individual balancing 
supplier. That is because such bids, if allocated, can act as fill-ins for other, more complex bids to be 
matched in total to current balancing demand. This finding should spur balancing suppliers to improve 
more technologically, e.g., by adopting advanced battery technology or optimizing fleet charging and 
usage. In addition, the results suggest that longer runtimes, usually seen in more inflexible and traditional 
plants, can be of value to bidders and should not be ruled out as a means to participate in the auction. 
Interestingly, local non-monotonicity reflects the combinatorial nature of the auction. In order to increase 
allocations of longer runtimes, balancing suppliers must either look into generating accurate and reliable 
balancing demand forecasts or use pooling effects to be able to internally manage their reported 
flexibility. Additionally, longer runtimes can also act as fill-ins, as they might be less expensive in total 
when combined with other bids (in the opposing direction) from other balancing suppliers. 
 
 
(a)                                                                                     (b) 
Figure 3.  (a) Savings for the DSO given varying number of bidders and (b) ratio of allocated bids 
per bidder given different market size 
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Finally, we consider computational runtimes for different configurations of balancing supply, i.e. the 
number of bidders. The runtime is defined as the sum of the runtime of the winner determination 
problem as well as all runtimes required for payment calculations. For 𝑛 = 50  bidders, the average 
runtime is 4.76s (𝜎 = 3.57), for 𝑛 = 100 it is 16.99s (𝜎 = 10.46), for 𝑛 = 150 we measured 36.72s (𝜎 =
21.83), and for 𝑛 = 200 the runtime amounts to 64.63s (𝜎 = 39.99). Clearly, the runtimes increases with 
more auction participants. However, note that as described in the assumptions, bids are limited by 
supplier 𝑖's minimum runtime 𝑚𝑖 and a XOR relationship over specific subsets. 
Conclusions 
The contributions of this research are an electrical load flexibility auction along with a compact bidding 
language. We extend the general WD and bidding language by minimum and maximum amounts, unit 
prices, a combination of energy production and consumption potential, and a fixed price outside option in 
procurement auctions. We have provided an analysis of the potential for cost reduction by DSOs and of 
the suitability of customer sets with different characteristics. We have evaluated the artifact by means of 
simulation which is partially based on real-world data. The evaluation has shown the efficacy and 
usefulness of the artifact in different scenarios, enabling DSOs to balance grid load by procuring 
generation and consumption of electrical load. Our findings provide evidence that load flexibility auctions 
can reduce DSOs costs substantially and that procurement package auctions are well-suited to address the 
grid load balancing problem. 
The implications for DSOs are based on the potential for cost reduction. However, DSOs have to carefully 
analyze the structure of their customers to assess the potential benefits. In particular, the customer 
population should be comprised of a mix of larger but also smaller customers to maximize synergies by 
also facilitating balancing between customers. 
In future work, we will investigate the application of bidder-Pareto-optimal core payment rules to the 
problem addressed. Further, we will analyze the suitability of more compact bidding languages and 
investigate the trade-off between complexity and expressiveness for electrical load flexibility auctions. 
Although VCG mechanisms are the only efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms, they can result in 
unacceptably low seller revenues for forward auctions, or high buyer payments in procurement auctions, 
and low perceived fairness of prices. The application of core-selecting auctions can mitigate these issues. 
As Day and Raghavan (2007) show, a payment rule that minimizes total payments in the core (for 
procurement auctions, payments have to be maximized in the core) also minimizes incentives to deviate 
from truthful bidding. In addition, whenever the VCG outcome is in the core, it is selected by a bidder-
Pareto-optimal core mechanism (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002; Day and Milgrom 2008). 
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